

# **Apollo3-Blue Secure Bootloader Scripts User's Guide**

**Revision 2.3  
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## Revision History

Date	Revision	History	Reviser
Mar 22, 2018	0.1	Initial Version	J. Shah
Mar 29, 2018	0.2	Updated details and created separate sections for Non-Secure and Secure Also, separated out external content	J. Shah
Mar 29, 2018	1.0	Apollo3-Blue SDK Alpha Release	J. Shah
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# Contents

1.	Introduction .....	5
2.	References.....	5
3.	Preparation of the Python Environment.....	6
4.	Keys.....	7
5.	Image Generation Scripts .....	8
5.1	Generating Customer InfoSpace (INFO0).....	8
5.1.1	Example Usage:.....	9
5.2	Generating Customer Firmware Images .....	10
5.2.1	Example Usage:.....	10
6.	Generating Wired Update Images.....	12
6.1	Example Usage:.....	12
6.1.1	Create Non-Secure Wired Update Image blob.....	12
6.1.2	Create INFO0-NOOTA Wired Update Image blob.....	12
6.1.3	Create Secure Bootloader (SBL) Wired Update Image blob.....	13
6.1.4	Create Secure Wired Update Image blob .....	13
6.1.5	Create Patch Wired Update Image blob.....	14
7.	Creating Device Recovery Message .....	14
7.1	Example Usage:.....	14
7.1.1	Create Secure recover message .....	14
7.1.2	Create Non-Secure recover message.....	14
8.	UART Wired Update.....	16
8.1.1	Program INFO0 using INFO0-NOOTA.....	16
8.1.2	Program Main Non-Secure Firmware .....	16
8.1.3	Program Main Secure Firmware .....	17
8.1.4	Program SBL Upgrade Firmware.....	17
8.1.5	Recover the Device.....	17
8.1.6	Program Patch Upgrade.....	17
8.1.7	Upgrading multiple images in one step .....	17
8.1.8	Upgrading Large Binary (Using --split feature) .....	17
9.	OTA Update .....	20
9.1	Example Usage.....	20
9.1.1	AMOTA update of NonSecure/Secure Main Firmware .....	20
10.	Programming Options & Usage of scripts.....	21
10.1	INFO0.....	21
10.2	Firmware Images or Data Binaries (Non-Secure).....	22
10.3	Firmware Images or Data Binaries (Secure) .....	23
10.4	SBL Update .....	24
10.5	Ambiq Patch Update .....	25
10.6	Device Recovery.....	26

10.6.1	Non-Secure Part.....	26
10.6.2	Secure Part.....	26
11.	Example OTA Process flow using scripts.....	27

# 1. Introduction

Ambiq Apollo3-Blue SDK contains a number of python scripts to demonstrate generation of Customer InfoSpace (INFO0) settings, Customer Main images, and creation of images for the Wired Update protocol over UART. This document will explain their usage.

These scripts have been upgraded to be compatible with Apollo3-Blue-Plus, with the following changes:

- Extension of the Permanent Write Protections, Permanent Copy Protections, and SBL Overridable Write Protections, and SBL Overridable Copy Protections for the new Flash Instances #2 and #3.
- New Chip Type parameter to distinguish between Apollo3-Blue and Apoll3-Blue-Plus.

# 2. References

REF	Title	File
REF1	Apollo3-Blue Secure Update Flow	Apollo3-Blue_Secure_Update_Flow.pdf
REF2	AMOTA Example User's Guide	AMOTA_example_user's_guide.pdf

### 3. Preparation of the Python Environment

This document assumes that the user has a python3 environment available. The SBL scripts require the addition of the python crypto modules. Those can be obtained as follows:

```
pip install pycryptodome
```

```
pip install pyserial
```

Most of the python scripts discussed in this document can be found in **/tools/apollo3\_scripts/**  
OTA related scripts are placed in **/tools/amota/scripts/**

## 4. Keys

Most of the Python scripts expect a file named “keys\_info.py” to be present in the same directory.

This file contains all the sensitive key information – which are either controlled by the customers themselves, or obtained through Ambiq.

These keys are used to generate InfoSpace, and to generate encrypted/signed images and required for encrypting/signing the wired update messages, as per customer requirements.

Ambiq SDK provides a template file “keys\_info0.py” with dummy values, which is to be edited by the customer with correct values and renamed as “keys\_info.py”.

This file contains definition of:

- keyTbIAes = Infospace Decryption Keys
- keyTbIHmac = Infospace Authentication Keys
- custKey = 128b Customer defined Security Key which protects Infospace Read Access
- recoveryKey = 128b Unique Key value provided by Ambiq – used for device recovery

## 5. Image Generation Scripts

### 5.1 Generating Customer InfoSpace (INFO0)

INFO0 space on the target is 8K of separate flash area, which dictates the device behavior in a number of ways.

Script “create\_info0.py” can be used to create a binary file to be populated as INFO0. It uses the key information in “keys\_info.py” and allows the user to define a number of other INFO0 parameters based on command line.

```
usage: create_info0.py [-h] [--valid {0,1,2}] [--version VERSION]
                    [--main MAINPTR] [--secpol {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7}]
                    [--wrap {0,1,2}] [--sRst {0,1}] [-s {0,1}] [--p] {0,1}
                    [--sDbgAllowed {0,1}] [--erase {0,1}] [--prog INFOPROG]
                    [--snowipe {0,1}] [--swo {0,1}] [--dbgprot {0,1}]
                    [--trim CUSTTRIM] [--trim2 CUSTTRIM2]
                    [--gpio OVERRIDEGPIO] [--gpio|vl {0,1}]
                    [--wmask WIREDIFMASK] [--wS|Int WIREDSLVINT]
                    [--wI2c WIREDI2CADDR] [--wTO WIREDTIMEOUT] [--u0 U0]
                    [--u1 U1] [--u2 U2] [--u3 U3] [--u4 U4] [--u5 U5]
                    [--krev KREV] [--arev AREV] [--sresv SRESV]
                    [--chipid0 CHIPID0] [--chipid1 CHIPID1]
                    [--wprot0 WPROT0] [--wprot1 WPROT1] [--rprot0 RPROT0]
                    [--rprot1 RPROT1] [--swprot0 SWPROT0]
                    [--swprot1 SWPROT1] [--srprot0 SRPROT0]
                    [--srprot1 SRPROT1] [--wprot2 WPROT2] [--wprot3 WPROT3]
                    [--rprot2 RPROT2] [--rprot3 RPROT3] [--swprot2 SWPROT2]
                    [--swprot3 SWPROT3] [--srprot2 SRPROT2]
                    [--srprot3 SRPROT3] [--chipType {apollo3,apollo3p}]
                    [-k [KEYFILE]] [--loglevel {0,1,2,3,4,5}]
output
```

Generate Corvette Info0 Blob

positional arguments:  
output

Output filename (without the extension)

optional arguments:

```
-h, --help          show this help message and exit
--valid {0,1,2}    INFO0 valid 0 = uninitialized, 1 = valid, 2 = Invalid
                    (Default = 1)?
--version VERSION  version (Default = 0)?
--main MAINPTR     Main Firmware location (Default = 0xc000)?
--secpol {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7} Security Policy Bitmask (Default = 0)? (bit 0 = Auth,
                    bit 1 = Enc, bit 2 = Version Rollback)
--wrap {0,1,2}     Keywrap Algo (Default = 0)? (0 = none, 1 = XOR, 2 =
                    AES128)
--sRst {0,1}       Secure Boot on Soft Reset (Default = 0) ?
-s {0,1}           Secure Boot (Default = 0) ?
--p] {0,1}         Protection Lock Enabled (Default = 0) ?
--sDbgAllowed {0,1} Debugger allowed during (optional) Secondary
                    Bootloader (Default = 1) ?
--erase {0,1}     Info0 Erase Allowed (Default = 1) ?
--prog INFOPROG  INFO0 Program allowed (1 bit per quadrant) (Default =
                    0xf) ?
--snowipe {0,1}   Do not wipe SRAM on debugger connection (Default = 1)
                    ?
--swo {0,1}       debugger connection allowed (Default = 1) ?
--dbgprot {0,1}   Do not lock debugger (Default = 1) ?
--trim CUSTTRIM   customer trim ?
--trim2 CUSTTRIM2 customer trim ?
--gpio OVERRIDEGPIO Override GPIO (7 bit - in hex) - 0x7f for disabled
                    (Default = 0x7f)
--gpio|vl {0,1}   Override GPIO Polarity (0 = low, 1 = hi) (Default = 0)
--wmask WIREDIFMASK Wired interface mask (bit 0 = UART, bit 1 = SPI, bit 2
                    = I2C) (default = UART)
--wS|Int WIREDSLVINT Wired IOS interface handshake pin (default = 4)
--wI2c WIREDI2CADDR Wired IOS interface I2C Address (default = 0x20)
--wTO WIREDTIMEOUT Wired interface timeout in millisec (default = 20000)
--u0 U0           UART Config 0 (default = 0xFFFFFFFF)
```



```

--u1 U1          UART Config 1 (default = 0xFFFFFFFF)
--u2 U2          UART Config 2 (default = 0xFFFFFFFF)
--u3 U3          UART Config 3 (default = 0xFFFFFFFF)
--u4 U4          UART Config 4 (default = 0xFFFFFFFF)
--u5 U5          UART Config 5 (default = 0xFFFFFFFF)
--krev KREV      KEK Revocation Mask (Default 0xFFFFFFFF)
--arev AREV      AuthKey Revocation Mask (Default 0xFFFFFFFF)
--sresv SRESV    SRAM Reservation (Default 0x0)
--chipid0 CHIPID0 CHIPID0 for the device (Default 0)
--chipid1 CHIPID1 CHIPID1 for the device (Default 0)
--wprot0 WPROT0  Permanent Write Protections Mask for flash#0 (Default
0xFFFFFFFF)
--wprot1 WPROT1  Permanent Write Protections Mask for flash#1 (Default
0xFFFFFFFF)
--rprot0 RPROT0  Permanent Copy Protections Mask for flash#0 (Default
0xFFFFFFFF)
--rprot1 RPROT1  Permanent Copy Protections Mask for flash#1 (Default
0xFFFFFFFF)
--swprot0 SWPROT0 SBL overridable Write Protections Mask for flash#0
(Default 0xFFFFFFFF)
--swprot1 SWPROT1 SBL overridable Write Protections Mask for flash#1
(Default 0xFFFFFFFF)
--srprot0 SRPROT0 SBL overridable Copy Protections Mask for flash#0
(Default 0xFFFFFFFF)
--srprot1 SRPROT1 SBL overridable Copy Protections Mask for flash#1
(Default 0xFFFFFFFF)
--wprot2 WPROT2  Permanent Write Protections Mask for flash#2 (Default
0xFFFFFFFF)
--wprot3 WPROT3  Permanent Write Protections Mask for flash#3 (Default
0xFFFFFFFF)
--rprot2 RPROT2  Permanent Copy Protections Mask for flash#2 (Default
0xFFFFFFFF)
--rprot3 RPROT3  Permanent Copy Protections Mask for flash#3 (Default
0xFFFFFFFF)
--swprot2 SWPROT2 SBL overridable Write Protections Mask for flash#2
(Default 0xFFFFFFFF)
--swprot3 SWPROT3 SBL overridable Write Protections Mask for flash#3
(Default 0xFFFFFFFF)
--srprot2 SRPROT2 SBL overridable Copy Protections Mask for flash#2
(Default 0xFFFFFFFF)
--srprot3 SRPROT3 SBL overridable Copy Protections Mask for flash#3
(Default 0xFFFFFFFF)
--chipType {apollo3,apollo3p}
Chip Type: apollo3, apollo3p (default = apollo3)
-k [KEYFILE]     key file in specified format [default = keys_info.py]
--loglevel {0,1,2,3,4,5}
Set Log Level (0: None), (1: Error), (2: INFO), (4:
Verbose), (5: Debug) [Default = Info]

```

## 5.1.1 Example Usage:

### 5.1.1.1 Create INFO0 Image for non-secure Usage

Create INFO0 image with GPIO Override is set to pin 47 (0x2f) active low. Baudrate for INFO0 UART is set to 115200 (0x1C200). Main image is expected at 0xC000.

```

./create_info0.py --valid 1 info0 --pl 1 --u0 0x1C200c0 --u1 0xFFFFF3031 --u2 0x2
--u3 0x0 --u4 0x0 --u5 0x0 --main 0xC000 --gpio 0x2f --version 0 --wTO 5000

```

### 5.1.1.2 Create INFO0 Image for secure Usage (Only applicable for secure SKU)

Create INFO0 image with GPIO Override is set to pin 47 (0x2f) active low. Baudrate for INFO0 UART is set to 115200 (0x1C200). Main image is expected at 0xC000. Secure Boot is enabled.

```

./create_info0.py --valid 1 info0 --pl 1 --u0 0x1C200c0 --u1 0xFFFFF3031 --u2 0x2
--u3 0x0 --u4 0x0 --u5 0x0 --main 0xC000 --gpio 0x2f --version 0 --wTO 5000 -s 1

```

## 5.2 Generating Customer Firmware Images

Apollo3-Blue and Apollo3-Blue-Plus SBL recognizes a number of different image types.

- Main (Secure Firmware)
- NonSecure (Non-Secure Firmware)
- Child (3<sup>rd</sup> Party firmware libraries)
- Info0 (Info0 Update Binary)
- CustOTA (Other) – Used with Secondary bootloader to pass through customer specific upgrade image types

Details of individual image formats is described in a separate document ([REF1]).

Script “create\_cust\_image\_blob.py” can be used to create a binary image blob as understood by the SBL.

The images generated such are good to be used directly with Flash Programming Tools (Jflash/JFlashLite, IAR, Keil), or transferred to the device wirelessly using customer defined OTA protocol and application.

```
usage: create_cust_image_blob.py [-h] [--bin APPFILE]
                                  [--load-address LOADADDRESS]
                                  [--magic-num {0xc0,0xcc,0xc1,0xcb,0xcf}]
                                  [-o OUTPUT]
                                  [--authkey {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}]
                                  [--kek {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}]
                                  [--authalgo {0,1}] [--encalgo {0,1}]
                                  [--child0 CHILD0] [--child1 CHILD1]
                                  [--version VERSION] [--crcI {0,1}]
                                  [--crcB {0,1}] [--authI {0,1}]
                                  [--authB {0,1}] [--erasePrev {0,1}]
                                  [-p {0,1,2,3}] [-k [KEYFILE]]
                                  [--loglevel {0,1,2,3,4,5}]
```

Generate Corvette Image Blob

optional arguments:

```
-h, --help            show this help message and exit
--bin APPFILE         binary file (blah.bin)
--load-address LOADADDRESS
                        Load address of the binary.
--magic-num {0xc0,0xcc,0xc1,0xcb,0xcf}
                        Magic Num (0xc0: Main, 0xcc: Child, 0xc1: CustOTA,
                        0xcb: NonSecure, 0xcf: Info0) - default[Main]
-o OUTPUT             Output filename (without the extension)
--authkey {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}
                        Authentication Key Idx? (8 to 15)
--kek {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}
                        KEK Index? (8 to 15)
--authalgo {0,1}     Authentication Algo? (0(default) = none, 1 = SHA256)
--encalgo {0,1}     Encryption Algo? (0(default) = none, 1 = AES128)
--child0 CHILD0     child (blobPtr#0 for Main / feature key for AM3P)
--child1 CHILD1     child (blobPtr#1 for Main)
--version VERSION   version (15 bit)
--crcI {0,1}        Install CRC check enabled (Default = Y)?
--crcB {0,1}        Boot CRC check enabled (Default = N)?
--authI {0,1}       Install Authentication check enabled (Default = N)?
--authB {0,1}       Boot Authentication check enabled (Default = N)?
--erasePrev {0,1}  erasePrev (Valid only for main)
-p {0,1,2,3}        protection info 2 bit c w
-k [KEYFILE]        key file in specified format [default = keys_info.py]
--loglevel {0,1,2,3,4,5}
                        Set Log Level (0: None), (1: Error), (2: INFO), (4:
                        verbose), (5: Debug) [Default = Info]
```

### 5.2.1 Example Usage:

#### 5.2.1.1 Create a non-secure customer image

Create a non-secure customer image from a built binary with Flash base address of 0xC000 (hello\_world.bin). This is the Customer Main Non-Secure format from the [REF1].

```
./create_cust_image_blob.py --bin hello_world.bin --load-address 0xC000 --magic-  
num 0xCB -o main_nonsecure_ota --version 0x0
```

### 5.2.1.2 Create a secure customer image

Create a secure customer image from a built binary with Flash base address of 0xC100 (hello\_world\_0xc100.bin). This is the Customer Main format from the [REF1]. AES128 encryption (kek, encalgo) and SHA256-HMAC based authentication is enabled (authkey, authalgo, authI). Post install boots should verify the signature for authenticity (authB).

```
./create_cust_image_blob.py --bin hello_world_0xc100.bin --load-address 0xC000 -  
-magic-num 0xC0 -o main_secure_ota --version 0x0 --kek 8 --authkey 10 --encalgo  
1 --authalgo 1 --authB 1 --authI 1
```

## 6. Generating Wired Update Images

To facilitate Wired update using SBL through an external host, the image blobs are further encapsulated in a predefined format as described in [REF1].

Script “create\_cust\_wireupdate\_blob.py” facilitates generation of these encapsulated images.

This script also internally takes care of generating split encapsulated images, if the image size is bigger than what can be accepted by SBL in one transaction over wired interface.

```
usage: create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py [-h] [--load-address LOADADDRESS]
                                     [--bin APPFILE]
                                     [-i {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,32}]
                                     [--options OPTIONS] [-o OUTPUT]
                                     [--authkey {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}]
                                     [--kek {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}]
                                     [--authalgo {0,1}] [--encalgo {0,1}]
                                     [--split SPLIT] [-k [KEYFILE]]
                                     [--loglevel {0,1,2,3,4,5}]
```

Generate Corvette Wired Update Blob

optional arguments:

```
-h, --help            show this help message and exit
--load-address LOADADDRESS
                    Load address of the binary - where in flash the blob
                    will be stored (could be different than install
                    address of binary within).
                    binary file (blah.bin)
--bin APPFILE        binary file (blah.bin)
-i {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,32}
                    ImageType (0: SBL, 1: AM3P, 2: Patch, 3: Main, 4:
                    Child, 5: CustOTA, 6: NonSecure, 7: Info0, 32:
                    Info0-NOOTA) - default[Main]
--options OPTIONS    Options (16b hex value) - bit0 instructs to perform
                    OTA of the image after wired download (set to 0 if
                    only downloading & skipping OTA flow)
-o OUTPUT            Output filename (without the extension)
--authkey {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}
                    Authentication Key Idx? (8 to 15)
--kek {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}
                    KEK Index? (8 to 15)
--authalgo {0,1}     Authentication Algo? (0(default) = none, 1 = SHA256)
--encalgo {0,1}      Encryption Algo? (0(default) = none, 1 = AES128)
--split SPLIT        Specify the max block size if the image will be
                    downloaded in pieces
-k [KEYFILE]         key file in specified format [default = keys_info.py]
--loglevel {0,1,2,3,4,5}
                    Set Log Level (0: None), (1: Error), (2: INFO), (4:
                    verbose), (5: Debug) [Default = Info]
```

### 6.1 Example Usage:

#### 6.1.1 Create Non-Secure Wired Update Image blob

Create Non-Secure Wired Update Image blob corresponding to the Upgrade image (generated as in section 5.2.15.2.1.1), as shown in the [REF1]:

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0x20000 --bin
main_nonsecure_ota.bin -i 6 -o main_nonsecure_wire --options 0x1
```

#### 6.1.2 Create INFO0-NOOTA Wired Update Image blob

Create INFO0-NOOTA Wired Update Image blob from the INFO0 image (generated as in section 5.1.15.1.1.1) in the previous step:

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --bin info0.bin -o info0_wire -i 32 --load-address 0
```

### 6.1.3 Create Secure Bootloader (SBL) Wired Update Image blob

Create SBL Wired Update Image blob corresponding to the Upgrade image (provided by Ambiq), as shown in the [REF1]:

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0x20000 --bin sbl_ota.bin -i 0 -o sbl_wire --options 0x1
```

### 6.1.4 Create Secure Wired Update Image blob

Create Secure Wired Update Image blob corresponding to the Secure or non-secure Upgrade image (generated as in section 5.2.15.2.1.1 or section 5.2.1.2), as shown in the [REF1]:

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0x20000 --bin main_nonsecure_ota.bin -i 6 -o main_nonsecure_swire --options 0x1 --kek 11 --authkey 10 --encalgo 1 --authalgo 1
```

OR (for secure main image)

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0x20000 --bin main_secure_ota.bin -i 3 -o main_secure_swire --options 0x1 --kek 11 --authkey 10 --encalgo 1 --authalgo 1
```

Secure wired update ensures that only trusted host is allowed to download any upgrades to the device. Please note that this is not to be confused with the nonsecure or secure image itself, which pertains to validation enforcements by the SBL on the installed images.

## 6.1.5 Create Patch Wired Update Image blob

Create Patch Wired Update Image blob corresponding to the Upgrade image (provided by Ambiq), as shown in the [REF1]:

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0x20000 --bin patch_ota.bin -i 2  
-o patch_wire --options 0x1
```

## 7. Creating Device Recovery Message

A corrupt INFO0 (e.g. invalid signature, or invalid values for Security fields) on a secure SKU Apollo3-Blue MCU causes SBL to go into a “recovery” mode. The only option possible in this case is to use the Wired Update feature to send a “RECOVER” message with proper credentials to do a factory-reset.

To generate a RECOVER message with proper credentials, customer would need to contact Ambiq using a secure channel and provide certain details (Unique CustomerID assigned to them, a range of CHIP Part#s along with a unique 128b Nonce value). Ambiq will then provide an “Ambiq Recovery Blob”, which is bound to the CustomerID, Nonce and particular part.

Even for non-secure SKU’s this procedure can be used to revert back to factory settings.

Script “create\_recover\_message.py” can then be used to generate the “RECOVER” message using the Ambiq Recovery Blob, along with customer supplied Nonce & CustomerID.

```
usage: create_recover_msg.py [-h] [-f BINFILE] [-o OUTPUT] [--n0 N0] [--n1 N1]  
                             [--n2 N2] [--n3 N3] [--custId CUSTID]
```

Generate Corvette Recovery Message

optional arguments:

```
-h, --help          show this help message and exit  
-f BINFILE          Binary file representing the raw Recovery Blob provided by  
                   Ambiq  
-o OUTPUT           Output filename (without the extension)  
--n0 N0             Nonce 0 - should correspond to the value provided to Ambiq  
                   (default = 0xFFFFFFFF)  
--n1 N1             Nonce 1 - should correspond to the value provided to Ambiq  
                   (default = 0xFFFFFFFF)  
--n2 N2             Nonce 2 - should correspond to the value provided to Ambiq  
                   (default = 0xFFFFFFFF)  
--n3 N3             Nonce 3 - should correspond to the value provided to Ambiq  
                   (default = 0xFFFFFFFF)  
--custId CUSTID    Customer ID - should correspond to the value provided to  
                   Ambiq (default = 0xFFFFFFFF)
```

### 7.1 Example Usage:

#### 7.1.1 Create Secure recover message

Create Secure recover message for customer with custID 0x1000, with supplied Ambiq Recover Blob in am\_rec.bin (generated corresponding to nonce 0x0, 0xDEADBEEF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xA5A55A5A)

```
./create_recover_msg.py -f am_rec.bin -o recover_secure --n0 0 --n1 0xDEADBEEF --n2  
0xFFFFFFFF --n3 0xA5A55A5A --custId 0x1000
```

#### 7.1.2 Create Non-Secure recover message

Create Non-Secure recover message for customer with custID 0x1000 (generated corresponding to nonce 0x0, 0xDEADBEEF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xA5A55A5A)

```
./create_recover_msg.py -o recover
```



## 8. UART Wired Update

For UART based wired update to work, the device needs to be provisioned to allow UART wired update through InfoSpace settings. SBL will get into update mode in one of the two cases:

- Encountering fatal error (e.g. invalid main image)
- GPIO Override (configured through InfoSpace)

The host needs to be connected to the device on the configured pins to match with the InfoSpace UART configurations, and needs to initiate the communication within a short window configured (through InfoSpace).

Script “uart\_wired\_update.py” is designed to emulate the host side functions in a limited way when using the UART as wired interface.

```
usage: uart_wired_update.py [-h] [-b BAUD] [--raw RAW] [-f BINFILE]
                             [-i {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,32,255}] [-o OTADESC]
                             [-r {0,1,2}] [-a {0,1,-1}] [--split SPLIT]
                             port
```

UART Wired Update Host for Apollo3

positional arguments:

port Serial COMx Port

optional arguments:

```
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-b BAUD Baud Rate (default is 115200)
--raw RAW Binary file for raw message
-f BINFILE Binary file to program into the target device
-i {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,32,255} ImageType (0: SBL, 1: AM3P, 2: Patch, 3: Main, 4:
Child, 5: CustOTA, 6: NonSecure, 7: Info0 32:
Info0_NOOTA) 255: Invalid) - default[Invalid]
-o OTADESC OTA Descriptor Page address (hex) - (Default is
0xFE000 - at the end of main flash) - enter 0xFFFFFFFF
to instruct SBL to skip OTA
-r {0,1,2} Should it send reset command after image download? (0
= no reset, 1 = POI, 2 = POR) (default is 1)
-a {0,1,-1} Should it send abort command? (0 = abort, 1 = abort
and quit, -1 = no abort) (default is -1)
--split SPLIT Specify the max block size if the image will be
downloaded in pieces
```

### 8.1.1 Program INFO0 using INFO0-NOOTA

Use the UART Wired Update script to (re)program INFO0 using the INFO0-NOOTA blob (generated as in section 6.1.2):

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 0 -f info0_wire.bin -i 32
```

### 8.1.2 Program Main Non-Secure Firmware

Use the UART Wired Update script to (re)program Main Firmware using the Non-Secure wire update blob (generated as in section 6.1.1)<sup>1</sup>:

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 1 -f main_nonsecure_wire.bin -i 6
```

---

<sup>1</sup> The default command assumes last page of available flash to construct the OTA descriptor page, as required by the Upgrade process, as described in [REF1]. For non-default allocation of the OTA descriptor page, it can be specified using `-o` parameter.



### 8.1.3 Program Main Secure Firmware

Use the UART Wired Update script to (re)program Secure Main Firmware using the Secure wire update blob (generated as in section 6.1.36.1.1):

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 1 -f main_secure_swire.bin -i 3
```

### 8.1.4 Program SBL Upgrade Firmware

Use the UART Wired Update script to upgrade SBL Firmware using the SBL wire update blob (generated as in section 6.1.3):

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 1 -f sbl_wire.bin -i 0
```

### 8.1.5 Recover the Device

Use the UART Wired Update script to send Device Recover message (generated as in section 7.1.2):

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 0 -o 0xFFFFFFFF --raw recover.msg
```

### 8.1.6 Program Patch Upgrade

Use the UART Wired Update script to program patch using the patch wire update blob (generated as in section 6.1.5):

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 1 -f patch_wire.bin -i 2
```

### 8.1.7 Upgrading multiple images in one step

SBL supports upgrading multiple images in a single upgrade cycle using multiple entries in OTA Descriptor.

UART Wired Update scripts can be used to achieve the same. The script is to be run multiple times, once for each image. The key here is that OTA Descriptor is to be set only in the first invocation, and reset is to be issued only for the last one.

Example below shows upgrading an isolated data segments and main image (all considered non-secure main images generated as in section 6.1.1) together using `uart_wired_update.py`:

First image (also programs the OTA Descriptor, and does not reset the device):

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -f img1_nonsecure_wire.bin -i 6 -r 0
```

Second image (does not program the OTA Descriptor or reset the device):

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -f img2_nonsecure_wire.bin -i 6 -r 0 -o  
0xFFFFFFFF
```

Third image (does not program the OTA Descriptor but resets the device to initiate the upgrade):

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -f img3_nonsecure_wire.bin -i 6 -r 1 -o  
0xFFFFFFFF
```

### 8.1.8 Upgrading Large Binary (Using `--split` feature)

The SBL reserves a ~96Kbytes SRAM area for its own operation and leaves a maximum usable SRAM for wired update the total SRAM size – 96Kbytes, e.g. 288Kbytes in Apollo3Blue. When the target user binary is larger than the usable SRAM size, the customer wired update blob binary will be automatically split into chunks of maximum usable SRAM size as default setting, e.g. for Apollo3Blue 288Kbytes per chunk.

For example, in the case below, a binary of 799800bytes is converted into a wired update blob, and is automatically split into 288Kbytes chunks.

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0xc000 --bin <input_file_name> -i 6 -o <output_file_name> --options 0x1
```

```
(base) >python create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0xc000 --bin mspi_psram_display_HW_480_480.bin -i 6 -o nonsecure_ota_wire_blob --options 0x1
Header Size = 0x60
app_size 0xc3438 ( 799800 )
Image size bigger than max - Creating Split image
Writing to file nonsecure_ota_wire_blob.bin
Image from 0x0 to 0x48000 will be loaded at 0xc000
Writing to file nonsecure_ota_wire_blob.bin
Image from 0x48000 to 0x90000 will be loaded at 0x54000
Writing to file nonsecure_ota_wire_blob.bin
Image from 0x90000 to 0xc3438 will be loaded at 0x9c000
```

User can later on use uart\_wired\_update.py load the target blob into the target device, e.g.:

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 1 -f <target file name> -i 6
```

```
(base) C:\_Work\_events2019\1108_sbl_reserved_ram>python uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM21 -r 1 -f nonsecure_ota_wire_blob.bin -i 6
Connecting with Corvette over serial port COM21...
Sending Hello.
Received response for Hello
Received Status
length = 0x58
version = 0x3
Max Storage = 0x4ffa0
Status = 0x2
State = 0x7
AMInfo =
0x1
0xff2da3ff
0x557ff
0x11
0x49f40003
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
Sending OTA Descriptor = 0xfe000
```

**Note:**

If the target device has Info0 setup with --sresv (SRAM reservation), user cannot leave the --split parameter as default. When generate target blob file and loading the blob file into the target device, --split parameter has to be specified.

The maximum --split value is calculated as:

Total SRAM size - 96Kbytes - SRAM reservation size

E.g. If the info0 specifies a 32Kbytes of SRAM reservation on Apollo3Blue, the maximum --split value is:

384Kbytes - 96Kbytes - 32Kbytes = 256Kbytes (0x40000)

In such case, user should add --split 0x40000 parameter both for blob generation and for UART loading.

As shown below:

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0xc000 --bin <input_file_name> -i 6  
-o <output file name> --options 0x1 --split 0x40000
```

```
(base) >python create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address  
0xc000 --bin mspi_psram_display_HW_480_480.bin -i 6 -o nonsecure_ota_wire_blob --options 0x1 --split 0  
x40000  
Header Size = 0x60  
app_size 0xc3438 ( 799800 )  
Image size bigger than max - Creating Split image  
Writing to file nonsecure_ota_wire_blob.bin  
Image from 0x0 to 0x40000 will be loaded at 0xc000  
Writing to file nonsecure_ota_wire_blob.bin  
Image from 0x40000 to 0x80000 will be loaded at 0x4c000  
Writing to file nonsecure_ota_wire_blob.bin  
Image from 0x80000 to 0xc0000 will be loaded at 0x8c000  
Writing to file nonsecure_ota_wire_blob.bin  
Image from 0xc0000 to 0xc3438 will be loaded at 0xcc000
```

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM4 -r 1 -f <target_file_name> -i 6 --split  
0x40000
```

```
(base) >python uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM4 -r 1 -f n  
onsecure_ota_wire_blob.bin -i 6 --split 0x40000  
Connecting with Corvette over serial port COM4...  
Sending Hello.  
Received response for Hello  
Received Status  
length = 0x58  
version = 0x5  
Max Storage = 0x4fba0  
Status = 0x2  
State = 0x7  
AMInfo =  
0x1  
0xff2da3ff  
0x557ff  
0x1  
0x4cd00005  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
0xffffffff  
Sending OTA Descriptor = 0xfe000  
Sending Update Command.  
number of updates needed = 4  
Sending block of size 0x3498 from 0xc0120 to 0xc35b8  
Sending Data Packet of length 8180  
Sending Data Packet of length 5284  
Sending block of size 0x40060 from 0x800c0 to 0xc0120
```

## 9. OTA Update

Ambiq SDK provides an example OTA application AMOTA, which implements a specific transfer protocol with a counterpart host implemented as a Phone App (Ambiq\_BLE App)

Script “ota\_binary\_converter.py” in `\tools\amota\scripts\` can be used to generate an OTA blob compatible to AMOTA. Most of the optional parameters are no longer relevant for Apollo3.

### 9.1 Example Usage

#### 9.1.1 AMOTA update of NonSecure/Secure Main Firmware

Generate the OTA blob compatible to AMOTA using the Update Image (generated as in section 5.2.1.1 or section 5.2.1.2):

```
./ota_binary_converter.py --appbin main_ota.bin -o main_ota_amota
```


Thereafter, the normal procedure to upgrade the image using AMOTA & Ambiq\_BLE App on the phone ([REF2]) can be followed to upgrade the image on the device.

# 10. Programming Options & Usage of scripts

This section depicts various options of programming the device, and how the scripts described in this document facilitate the same.


## 10.1 INFO0

- Script <create\_info0.py> can be used to create an INFO0 binary.
- There are multiple ways thereafter to update Device Info0 to match with this generated binary.
  - Using Jlink Script <jlink-prog-info0.txt>
  - Using OTA
    - Generate OTA image using <create\_cust\_image\_blob.py> with image type Info0
    - Update it over the air
  - Using Wired Update
    - Two possible options:
      - No OTA - This will cause SBL to update Info0 bypassing the OTA processing
        - Create Wired Update Blob using <create\_cust\_wired\_update\_blob.py> with image type Info0-NoOTA
        - Use <uart\_wired\_update.py> to download using image type Info0-NoOTA
      - Process it through regular OTA processing (like other images)
        - Generate OTA image using <create\_cust\_image\_blob.py> with image type Info0
        - Create Wired Update Blob using <create\_cust\_wired\_update\_blob.py> with image type Info0
        - Use <uart\_wired\_update.py> to download using image type Info0




## 10.2 Firmware Images or Data Binaries (Non-Secure)

- Generate Program Image using preferred toolchain (linked at 0xC000 or above [to match with INFO0 setting]).
- There are multiple ways thereafter to update the Device with this generated binary.
  - Using Flashing Tools or IDEs to program the flash (use the generated image directly)
  - Using OTA
    - Generate OTA image using `<create_cust_image_blob.py>` with image type NonSecure
    - Update it over the air
  - Using Wired Update
    - Generate OTA image using `<create_cust_image_blob.py>` with image type NonSecure
    - Create Wired Update Blob using `<create_cust_wired_update_blob.py>` with image type NonSecure
    - Use `<uart_wired_update.py>` to download using image type NonSecure
  - Manufacturing Programming
    - For the first time programming at manufacturing facility, the image could be directly loaded to the final install location without needing to go through the traditional OTA
    - Create Wired Update Blob using `<create_cust_wired_update_blob.py>` with image type NonSecure – set options as 0 (Disable OTA). Use load-address as the actual install address
    - Use `<uart_wired_update.py>` to download using image type NonSecure




### 10.3 Firmware Images or Data Binaries (Secure)

- Generate Program Image using preferred toolchain (linked at 0xC100 [match with INFO0 setting + 0x100]).
- Generate Update image using `<create_cust_image_blob.py>` with image type Main
  - This will create necessary headers needed by SBL for secure boot.
- There are multiple ways thereafter to update the Device with this generated update image.
  - Using Flashing Tools or IDEs to program the flash (use the update image directly)
  - Update it over the air (use the update image directly)
  - Using Wired Update
    - Create Wired Update Blob using `<create_cust_wired_update_blob.py>` with image type Main
    - Use `<uart_wired_update.py>` to download using image type Main



## 10.4 SBL Update


- SBL update image is provided by Ambiq.
- There are multiple ways thereafter to update the Device with this generated update image.
  - Update it over the air (use the update image directly)
  - Using Wired Update
    - Create Wired Update Blob using `<create_cust_wired_update_blob.py>` with image type SBL
    - Use `<uart_wired_update.py>` to download using image type SBL





## 10.5 Ambiq Patch Update


- Ambiq Patch update image is provided by Ambiq.
- There are multiple ways thereafter to update the Device with this generated update image.
  - Update it over the air (use the update image directly)
  - Using Wired Update
    - Create Wired Update Blob using `<create_cust_wired_update_blob.py>` with image type patch
    - Use `<uart_wired_update.py>` to download using image type patch



## 10.6 Device Recovery


### 10.6.1 Non-Secure Part

- Generate RECOVER message using `<create_recover_msg.py>`
- Use `<uart_wired_update.py>` to send the recover message using “raw” option



### 10.6.2 Secure Part

- Contact Ambiq securely to get Ambiq Recovery Blob specific to the part(s).
- Generate RECOVER message using `<create_recover_msg.py>`, supplying the aforementioned blob image.
- Use `<uart_wired_update.py>` to send the recover message using “raw” option




## 11. Example OTA Process flow using scripts

Please refer to [REF1] for various image types, the corresponding header formats, and the overall design of the Secure OTA in Apollo3 Blue.

This section briefly describes how the sample scripts supplied with Ambiq Apollo3 SDK can be used to help with the OTA process.

- Generate the Program Image prg.bin (linked at 0xC000) using IDE of choice
- Create Corresponding OTA Image ota.bin using <create\_cust\_image\_blob.py>
  - load-address (0xC000) specified indicates where the user wants the image to be installed in main flash at the end of OTA
- Create Wired Update Image Blob to prepare the OTA image for wired update, wu.bin using <create\_cust\_wireupdate\_blob.py>
  - Set options to 0x1 to indicate to SBL to initiate an OTA for the downloaded image
  - load-address (0x60000) specified indicates where the user wants the image to be temporarily loaded in main flash before initiating OTA
    - For flash constrained systems, we allow this temp place to overlap with final install location, as long as the temp address is greater than or equal to install address) where you want to store the OTA image.
- Use script <uart\_wired\_update.py> to transfer the wired update blob, and instruct SBL to initiate OTA on the downloaded image
  - Option -o specifies where SBL can build the OTA Descriptor (Default is last page in flash)
    - Should point to a free page in flash
    - Cannot overlap with either the temporary load-address for the downloaded image, or the final install address for the main image
    - Cannot be located in a protected region of flash
  - This script configures the OTA Descriptor, downloads the Wired update blob and initiates the OTA of the same, following the process described in [REF1]



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